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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States health care system is under attack. Patients are
fed up with the low quality of care they receive from their health care
providers due to managed care's cost-cutting consequences. Today,
health care costs are so high that most people can only afford to re-
ceive medical care through an employee benefit plan. While costs
have escalated, however, the quality and variety of medical services
covered has declined. Society is enraged that the medical system al-
lows health care providers to limit the types of medical services cov-
ered in a health care plan while it tolerates a lower standard of quality
for the services actually provided.
This trend toward a decrease in the quality of health care began
when the nation's health care system moved from the traditional "fee-
for-service" care to "managed care."' In 1973, Congress passed the
Health Maintenance Organization Act (the 'IMOA"), which promoted
managed care organizations ("MCOs").2 Congress initially intended
the HMOA to "maintain" the country's good health in a preventative
manner, rather than to treat the country's failing health. Eventually,
employers recognized managed care as an effective system to reduce
the escalating costs of health care because of the limited services it
provided.
Only months after Congress passed the HMOA, Congress enacted
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), de-
signed to "promote interests of employees and their beneficiaries in
employee benefit plans."3 Thus, at the time Congress enacted ERISA,
the system of "managed care" was new and relatively rare.4 No one
1. See discussion infra notes 6-15 and accompanying text
2. Pub. L. No. 93-222, 87 Stat. 914 (1973)(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e et seq.
(1994)).
3. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq. (1994)).
4. See Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
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anticipated the long-term ramifications that resulted when the two
acts inevitably became entangled. 5
These ramifications, however, eventually became evident. In the
late 1980s and early 1990s, large numbers of providers switched to
managed care to contain costs. 6 Managed care successfully reduced
costs because it primarily seeks to reduce utilization of health care
services. 7 Tension soon developed, however, between managed care's
goal to reduce utilization with ERISA's goal to protect beneficiaries. 8
Quality soon gave way to physicians' financial self-interest as MCOs
developed procedures to induce physicians to substantially reduce and
even deny patient care.9 To limit utilization, primary care physicians
served as gatekeepers to limit specialist services, outpatient proce-
dures reduced hospitalization, prospective utilization reviews
screened covered services, and coverage was denied for any experi-
mental treatments.i 0 Most significantly, MCOs implemented capita-
tion requirements, offering physicians a fixed amount per patient
regardless of how much or how little care the patient needed, encour-
aging physicians to limit the amount of care they delivered.ii Unfor-
tunately, some patients were denied necessary care and sustained
serious injury; some even died.
While the American health care system transformed rapidly, pa-
tients struggled to redress their grievances against the MCOs. Ten-
5. See MK Gaedeke Roland, Comment, Looking for a Prince Among the Frogs: Solu-
tions to ERISA's Preemptive Effect on Improving Health Care, 47 BuFF. L. REV.
1487, 1488 (1999)(explaining that HMOs were largely unheard of in employee
benefit packages around the time the two acts were passed and that no one could
have foreseen how their juxtaposition would implicate the health care industry).
6. See Robert W. McGarrah, Jr., Managed Care and the Evolving Link Between Pa-
tients' Rights and Employees' Rights, SF28 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 65, 68 (2000).
7. See RAND E. RosENBLATT ET AL., LAW AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM
568 (1997) ("[Managed care plans] use prospective utilization review techniques
as well as practice guidelines to control physician utilization of resources.").
8. See Larry J. Pittman, ERISA's Preemption Clause and the Health Care Industry:
An Abdication of Judicial Law-Creating Authority, 46 FLA. L. REV. 355, 364
(1994)(describing the tension physicians faced between reducing health care cost
by limiting the amount of treatment rendered and satisfying the patient's desire
to receive all available medical treatment).
9. See Roland, supra note 5, at 1496-98 (stating that "[s]hortly following the enact-
ments of ERISA and HMOA, cost containment became the major goal of the na-
tion's health policy"); Julie K. Locke, Note, The ERISA Amendment: A
Prescription to Sue MCOs for Wrongful Treatment Decisions, 83 MiNN. L. REV.
1027, 1050-51 (1999)(stating that "[als more employers realized the cost benefits
of managed care, membership in MCOs exploded, but physicians and MCOs be-
gan to abuse the cost containment features of managed care health plans to the
detriment of employee beneficiaries").
10. See Barbara A Noah, The Managed Care Dilemma: Can Theories of Tort Liability
Adapt to the Realities of Cost Containment?, 48 MERCER L. REV. 1219, 1223-25
(1997).
11. See id. at 1226.
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sions mounted between the traditionally high medical malpractice
standard and the cost control methods of managed care. A vast major-
ity of MCOs qualify as employee benefit plans under ERISA, and ER-
ISA preempts all state law claims that "relate to" an employee benefit
plan.' 2 A broad reading of ERISA's preemption clause would, there-
fore, grant managed care entities protection from most state law tort
claims. Once in federal court under ERISA, however, many patients
find that ERISA does not grant them a viable alternative remedy
against their MCO. 13 To make matters worse, many courts have in-
terpreted ERISA to preclude patients from bringing federal actions di-
rectly against MCOs.14 As a result, ERISA has left patients no
recourse while it has left MCOs free to make treatment decisions in
the interest of profit rather than in the interest of their patients.15
Recently, the United States Supreme Court in Pegram v. Her-
drichi6 further insulated HMOs from liability under ERISA when it
denied a beneficiary's claim for breach of an ERISA fiduciary duty
against her HIMO based on the HMO's use of financial incentive ar-
rangements with its providers. In rendering its decision, the Supreme
Court failed to utilize the statutory resources Congress provided when
it enacted ERISA, resources that would have enabled the Supreme
Court to find an MCO liable for breach of its fiduciary duty. Conse-
quently, the Court's decision in Pegram reinforced - unnecessarily
and unfortunately - the protections from liability afforded to finan-
cially self-interested MCOs.
This Note advocates changing that result. MCOs, as fiduciaries,
should be liable when MCO physicians fail to provide patients the
quality of care they deserve as a result of the MCOs' cost-cutting ef-
forts. Part II provides essential background of ERISA and explains
the tensions between ERISA and managed care, and provides a
description of the facts and legal analysis in Pegram. Part III exam-
ines the Supreme Court's decision in Pegram and explains how the
Court blatantly abdicated its judicial law-creating authority by failing
to recognize the fiduciary obligation as a legitimate avenue of ERISA
liability against MCOs. Finally, Part IV discusses the effect that the
Court's abdication will have on the future of the medical industry.
12. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994)(stating that the Act "shall supercede any and all
State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit
plan").
13. ERISA provides no explicit federal cause of action against MCOs. See discussion
of ERISA infra notes 34-47 and accompanying text.
14. See infra discussion accompanying notes 48-59.
15. This Note recognizes that not all claims against MCOs are governed by ERISA. A
vast majority of federal remedies against MCOs, however, are governed by ER-
ISA because a vast majority of Americans receive their healthcare through an
employee benefit plan.
16. 530 U.S. 211, 120 S. Ct. 2143 (2000).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Emerging Conflict Between ERISA and Managed
Care
The increase in malpractice lawsuits against health care entities
occurred relatively recently in the United States.i7 For decades, the
health care market consisted mainly of self-employed physicians run-
ning their own practices or practicing in small groups.1 S These physi-
cians provided fee-for-service care, by which physicians received direct
payments for every procedure they deemed medically necessary.' 9
Physicians had direct control over the health care services provided to
patients, and malpractice lawsuits therefore focused on the physician
rather than the hospital.20
Fewer physicians continued to practice independently after Con-
gress passed the HMOA.21 This change, however, did not occur over-
night. It was not until the 1980s that the market recognized managed
care organizations as an effective system to drive down the escalating
price of health care. 22 Managed care organizations reduced costs be-
cause they competed within the health care market to drive down the
high price of health care.23 Over time, the escalating costs for health
17. See Noah, supra note 10, at 1230-1231.
18. See Edward P. Richards, The Police Power and the Regulation of Medical Prac-
tice: A Historical Review and Guide for Medical Licensing Board Regulation of
Physicians in ERISA-Qualified Managed Care Organizations, 8 ANNALS HEALTH
L. 201, 227 (1999) ("[p]hysicians were traditionally independent decision makers,
operating for their own self-interest, either as sole proprietors or in small
partnerships").
19. Id. at 227 (N[tlraditional fee-for-service medicine, paid for with indemnity insur-
ance plans that paid for all care that the patient's physician deemed medically
necessary had several checks and balances that operated to protect the quality of
patient care"). Fee-for-service medicine incited physicians to provide more rather
than less care because they were paid regardless of the cost. See id.
20. See Kenneth S. Abraham & Paul C. Weiler, Enterprise Medicare Liability and the
Evolution of the American Health Care System, 108 HARv. L. REV. 381, 382
(1994).
21. See 42 U.S.C. § 300e (1994).
22. See WENDY KNIGHT, MANAGED CARE: WHAT IT Is AND How IT WoRKs 6 (1998)(dis-
cussing the factors in the late 1960s and early 1970s that caused health care
costs to exceed the overall Consumer Price Index ("CPI"); see also Pittman, supra
note 8, at 356 (stating that the cost of health care in the United States is of na-
tional concern).
23. There are two basic models of MCOs, health maintenance organizations
("HMOs") and preferred provider organizations ("PPOs"). HMOs generally fur-
nish both primary care and hospital-based acute care over a specified period to
subscribers who prepay a set fee. This enrollment fee remains set regardless of
the actual costs of services. The inherent risk with IMOs is that the actual costs
of the services utilized by the subscriber will be more than the enrollment fee.
See Noah, supra note 10, at 1223-25 (citing DONALD K. FREEBORN & CLYDE R.
POPE, PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE IN MANAGED CARE: THE PREPAID GROUP PRAC-
TICE MODEL 20-21 (1994)). PPOs negotiate with physicians or hospitals at dis-
[Vol. 79:762
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care drove employers, who understood the value of maintaining a
healthy workforce, to utilize managed health care.24 As enrollment in
managed care increased, 2 5 physicians relinquished their indepen-
dence to work collectively for the MCOs.26
The HMOA cut costs by changing the medical industry's payment
system from fee-for-service to fixed-fee.27 Unlike the fee-for-service
system, the fixed-fee system limits reimbursement for medical care
services to the fixed amount received for each patient.28 MCOs, there-
fore, take steps to control costs, such as issuing reports to their physi-
cians about appropriate levels of care.29 In addition, many MCOs
have implemented utilization reviews 3 0 and financial incentives as
means to reduce the cost of providing care.3 1 MCOs make coverage
decisions when they compare the requested services against the plan's
counted fee-for-service rates. Subscribers pay the PPO premiums and the PPO
reimburses the participating physicians and hospitals for their services. See id.
at 1225.
24. See Roland, supra note 5, at 1497; Noah, supra note 10, at 1221 (noting that
medical spending increased at an average annual rate of 4.8% between 1960 and
1993, which, combined with other economic factors, led to the emergence of man-
aged care as a response to the escalating cost of receiving health care services).
25. See Ellyn Spragins, Does Your HMO Stack Up?, NEWSWEEK, June 24, 1996, at 56
(stating that 53.3 million people were enrolled in HMOs in 1995, up from 6 mil-
lion in 1976, and projecting that enrollment in HMOs would reach 103.2 million
by the year 2000).
26. See Noah, supra note 10, at 1219 (citing GENmI JAMES, MAING MANAGED CARE
WoRK 93 (1997))(stating that more than three quarters of physicians in the
United States practice within some form of MCO or see managed care patients).
27. See RoSENBLATr ET AL., supra note 7, at 543-46 (explaining the change from the
fee-for-service system to managed care); Andrea K. Marsh, Note, Sacrificing Pa-
tients for Profits: Physician Incentives to Limit Care and ERISA Fiduciary Duty,
77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1323, 1327-28 (1999)(stating that the managed care system
arose in response to escalating concerns about the fee-for-service system and ris-
ing health care costs).
28. As one court clarified:
A health maintenance organization.. . offers, for a fixed fee, as much
medical care as the patient needs. Providers using traditional fee-for-
service methods, by contrast, charge for each procedure.... a physician
receiving a fee for each service has an incentive to run up the bill by
furnishing unnecessary care, and an [MCO] has an incentive to skimp on
care (once patients have signed up and paid) in order to save costs.
Anderson v. Humana, Inc., 24 F.3d 889, 890 (7th Cir. 1994).
29. See ROSENBLATr ET AL., supra note 7, at 568-70.
30. See Lancaster v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 958 F. Supp. 1137, 1147 (E.D. Va.
1997)(describing utilization review as "the use of an independent or third-party
reviewer who evaluates a physician's medical decisions to determine the neces-
sity and cost-effectiveness of the recommended approach prior to hospitalization
or treatment").
31. See id. at 1147 (describing an incentive program as "bonuses to physicians who
refrain from ordering so-called "unnecessary" referrals or "unwarranted" diagnos-
tic tests"); see also RoSENBLArr ET AL., supra note 7, at 563-65.
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contractual terms to ensure that the request falls within the scope of
covered events.3 2
While the high price of health care concerned Congress in the early
1970s, the improvident management of employee pension plans was
also of concern.3 3 Thus, less than a year after Congress adopted the
HMOA, Congress passed ERISA.34 Congress hoped that ERISA
would protect employees and their families from pension funding
abuses.3 5 Congress planned to establish standards of conduct for fidu-
ciaries of employee benefit plans.3 6
Congress enacted ERISA with the ancillary goal of creating a uni-
form set of federal regulations to govern claims against employee ben-
efit plans.37  Consequently, Congress designed ERISA with a
preemption clause requiring state courts to remove to federal court
"any or all State laws" that "relate to" an employee benefit plan.38
Until 1994, courts had consistently interpreted ERISA's preemption
clause broadly, preempting most state tort actions challenging the
quality of care against MCOs.39 In fact, in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines,40
32. See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, -, 120 S. Ct. 2143, 2149 (2000).
33. See Roland, supra note 5, at 1493 ("Congress enacted ERISA in large part due to
the injustices many Americans suffered when they spent their lives working and
saving only to find at retirement that their pension finds were insolvent"); see
also Locke, supra note 9, at 1036 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 93-533, at 3-4 (1973), re-
printed in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4642).
34. See generally Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
35. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 496 (1996).
36. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 91 (1983).
37. See Pittman, supra note 8, at 360 (stating that "the use of ERISA's preemption
clause to protect employers and ERISA benefit plans from conflicting state laws
is only an ancillary purpose to the primary purpose of protecting employees' bene-
fits from the employers' administrative and funding abuses."); Richards, supra
note 18, at 223 (citing EDWARD P. RICHARDS & KATHARIE C. RATHBUN, MEDICAL
CARE LAW (1999))(stating that Congress wanted to allow multi-state companies
to sign uniform labor agreements across all state lines since, before ERISA,
multi-state corporations had to offer different health insurance plans because of
the differences in state laws regulating insurance); see also FMC Corp. v. Hol-
liday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990)(finding that federal regulations preempt state laws re-
garding employee benefit plans).
38. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a); Brian P. Battaglia, The Shift Toward Managed Care and
Emerging Liability Claims Arising From Utilization Management and Financial
Incentive Arrangements Between Health Care Providers and Payers, 19 U. ARK.
LrrrLE ROCK L.J. 155, 207-16 (1997)(discussing cases that outline the application
of ERISA's preemptive "relate to" language).
39. See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 138 (1990) ("Where, as here,
Congress has expressly included a broadly worded pre-emption provision in a
comprehensive statute such as ERISA, our task of discerning congressional in-
tent is considerably simplified."); FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. at 58 ("The
pre-emption clause is conspicuous for its breadth."); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v.
Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41-46 (1987)("We have observed in the past that the express
preemption provisions of ERISA are deliberately expansive. . .."); Shea v. Esen-
sten, 107 F.3d 625, 627 (8th Cir. 1997)(stating that "the language of ERISA's
768 [Vol. 79:762
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the Supreme Court held that a law "relates to" a plan if it merely has a
"connection with or reference to a plan."41 In Shaw, ERISA plan bene-
ficiaries argued that ERISA did not preempt a New York statute that
required employee benefit plans to provide sick leave benefits to preg-
nant women upon their request. 42 The Court broadly interpreted ER-
ISA's preemption clause, noting that it would give effect to the "relates
to" language in the normal sense of the phrase, unless there was good
reason to believe that Congress intended the language to have some
more restrictive meaning.43 The Court examined the requirements of
the New York statute and determined that requiring employers to
provide employees with specific benefits clearly "relates to" benefit
plans.44 The Court pointed out that ERISA's legislative history sup-
ported its decision to preempt the New York statute.4 5 According to
the Court, Congress rejected an early version of the preemption
clause, which limited preemption to the subject matters covered by
ERISA, replacing it with the present language.4 6 The Court decided
that this indicated a Congressional intent to apply ERISA's preemp-
tion clause broadly.4 7
Meanwhile, beneficiaries denied redress against their MCOs in
state court due to ERISA's expansive preemption clause attempted to
open other avenues of liability under ERISA. The development of
common-law claims against health care plans began in 1986 with the
California decision in Wickline v. State.48 Wickline introduced two
tort theories of liability against health benefit plans - direct and vi-
carious liability.49 Vicarious liability holds the MCO liable for the
negligence of its employees.O Under direct liability, the MCO is di-
rectly liable for any injury to its patients.5 ' Federal courts followed by
recognizing claims for vicarious liability.52 However, federal courts
preemption clause sweeps broadly, embracing common law causes of action if
they have a connection with or reference to an ERISA plan.").
40. 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983).
41. Id.
42. See id. at 88-93.
43. See id. at 96-97.
44. Id. at 100.
45. See id. at 98-100.
46. See id. at 98.
47. See id. at 99-100.
48. 239 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Ct. App. 1986)(involving an ERISA plan that denied a benefi-
ciary authorization for a longer hospital stay after post-surgical complications
developed, requiring amputation of the patient's leg).
49. See id. at 819.
50. See Locke, supra note 9, at 1035.
51. See id.
52. See, e.g., Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, 57 F.3d 350, 356 (3d Cir. 1995)(holding that
plaintiffs vicarious liability malpractice claim against U.S. Healthcare was not
preempted by ERISA); Locke, supra note 9, at 1037 (stating that despite ERISA
preemption, patients have had some success when bringing vicarious liability
2000]
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have consistently denied claims against MCOs for direct liability due
to the preemptive effect of ERISA.53 Not surprisingly, beneficiaries
who have been denied relief in federal court after having their claims
preempted by ERISA have grown frustrated with ERISA's preemption
clause.
For example, in Corcoran v. United HealthCare,54 the Fifth Circuit
held that ERISA preempted a medical malpractice claim against the
third-party plan administrator, United HealthCare, for coverage deci-
sions it made under its "pre-certification" review program.5 5 United
decided against hospitalizing Corcoran during her high-risk preg-
nancy and her unborn child died as a result.5 6 The Fifth Circuit rea-
soned that the decision not to hospitalize her involved a benefit
determination, bringing it under the guise of ERISA and preempting
the claim as one "relating to" benefits.5 7 After exhausting all their
arguments to stay out of federal court, the Corcorans dropped their
malpractice claim and pressed their claim directly under ERISA.58
The Fifth Circuit, however, held that "the result ERISA compels us to
reach means that the Corcorans have no remedy, state or federal, for
what may have been a serious mistake."59 Thus, beneficiaries cannot
redress their injuries against MCOs under ERISA because ERISA of-
fers no explicit cause of action against MCOs, preempting state laws
that might subject MCOs to liability.
Subsequently, in Kuhl v. Lincoln National Health Plan,6o the
Eighth Circuit held that ERISA preempted the Kuhl's state medical
malpractice claim against Mr. Kuhl's plan administrator. Buddy Kuhl
claims against MCOs). There are two main theories of vicarious liability: 1) re-
spondeat superior, where an employer-employee relationship exists between the
HMO and physician, and the physician's negligent behavior fell within the scope
of her employment, and 2) ostensible agency, where the patient relies on the
MCO's representation that the physician is its agent or employee, and the MCO
will be vicariously liable for the acts of the physician even if the physician turns
out to be an independent contractor. See id. at 1034 nn.38-39.
53. See discussion of ERISA preemption supra notes 38-47; see also Jass v. Pruden-
tial Health Care Plan, Inc., 88 F.3d 1482 (7th Cir. 1996)(finding that the complete
preemption doctrine applied to plaintiffs negligence claims against the pre-certi-
fication review administrator who had denied her request for physical therapy to
rehabilitate her knee subsequent to surgery); Tolton v. American Biodyne, 48
F.3d 937 (6th Cir. 1995)(holding that ERISA preempted Mr. Tolton's family's
wrongful death, improper refusal to authorize benefits, insurance bad faith, and
medical malpractice claims because they stemmed from benefit determinations
made by his health plan).
54. 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1033 (1992).
55. See id. at 1334.
56. See id. at 1322-23.
57. See id. at 1331.
58. See id. at 1334-36.
59. Id. at 1338.
60. 999 F.2d 298, 304 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1045 (1994).
[Vol. 79:762
DEATH OF A REMEDY
was an employee of Belger, a company that offers its employees a
health plan through Lincoln National.6 1 Lincoln National paid inde-
pendent physicians, hospitals, and other health care providers to
render medical services for its members. 6 2 Lincoln National then de-
termined whether the Belger plan covers a particular procedure or
hospitalization.63 When Buddy Kuhl suffered a heart attack, his pri-
mary care physician placed him in the care of a heart specialist who
concluded that surgery was necessary.64 Lincoln National then ar-
ranged for a second opinion, which confirmed that Buddy needed sur-
gery "in the next few weeks."6 5 Lincoln National, however, refused to
pre-certify the surgery because the doctor had scheduled the surgery
outside of Lincoln National's service area.66 By the time Lincoln Na-
tional authorized surgery, Kuhl's heart had deteriorated to a point
that surgery was no longer an option.67 Even though Lincoln Na-
tional refused to pay the expenses, the doctors placed Kuhl on a heart
transplant list.68 Unfortunately, he died while waiting.6 9 The Eighth
Circuit reasoned that because delaying pre-certification of heart sur-
gery arose from administration of benefits, it must be preempted by
ERISA.70 Ultimately, the Kuhls were denied redress in federal court
because the Eighth Circuit determined that the Kuhls' factual allega-
tions did not state a claim under ERISA.71
As ERISA's expansive preemption clause continually denied pa-
tients recourse in federal court, the United States Supreme Court de-
cided to revisit the scope of the preemption clause in New York State
Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance
Company.72 In Travelers, the plaintiffs challenged a New York stat-
ute that imposed a surcharge on fees charged to patients whose com-
mercial insurance coverage is purchased by an employee health care
plan governed by ERISA.73 The statute imposes surcharges on health
maintenance organizations if their membership fees paid by an ER-
ISA plan did not "relate to" employee benefit plans within the mean-
61. See id. at 299-300.
62. See id. at 299.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 300.
65. Id.
66. See id.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. See id. at 304.
71. See id.
72. 514 U.S. 645 (1995). Although Travelers did not address ERISA preemption in
the context of patient claims directly against negligent MCOs, the Court's opinion
offers insight into the inconsistencies between the language and purpose of the
statute. See Locke, supra note 9, at 1040.
73. See 514 U.S. at 649-50.
20001
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
ing of ERISA's preemption clause. 74 The Court examined ERISA's
objectives to determine the scope of ERISA's preemption of state
law.7 5 It noted that the basic purpose of preemption was to create
uniform law to govern employee benefit plans. 76 In contrast, New
York's statute imposes surcharges to equalize the price of premiums
among insurance providers so that one does not have a price advan-
tage over another.7 7 The court noted that cost uniformity was not an
object of preemption and that ERISA did not mean to bar such indirect
influences under state law.7 8 It resolved that ERISA only preempts
state laws that impose unacceptable burdens on a plan, such as man-
dating benefit structures or their administration, or providing alter-
nate enforcement mechanisms. 79 As such, the Court held that ERISA
did not preempt the statute in question.8 0
Travelers was the Court's first step in retreat from its broad inter-
pretation of the "relates to" language of the ERISA preemption clause.
Thereafter, courts began recognizing additional kinds of claims as not
preempted under ERISA. For example, the Fifth Circuit in Jamail,
Inc., v. Carpenters District Council of Houston Pension & Welfare
Trusts,81 allowed an employer to assert a federal common law cause of
action for restitution for excessive contributions to an ERISA plan. In
Provident Life & Accident Insurance Co. v. Waller,8 2 the Fourth Cir-
cuit created a federal common law cause of action for unjust enrich-
ment, despite the absence of such a remedy in ERISA's statutory
language.
The Supreme Court even seemed to expand the scope of the ERISA
fiduciary cause of action with its decision in Varity Corp. v. Howe.83
One of the few theories of liability available under ERISA is the fiduci-
ary cause of action. ERISA requires plan fiduciaries to "discharge
[their] duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the partici-
pants and beneficiaries."8 4 In Varity, the Supreme Court addressed
the issue of whether beneficiaries could assert breach of fiduciary duty
74. See id.
75. See id. at 655.
76. See id. at 656-57.
77. See id. at 685-59.
78. Id. at 661.
79. See id. at 658.
80. See id. at 662. The Court reasoned that the surcharge's effect on providing hospi-
tal benefits posed only an indirect economic effect that did not bind plan adminis-
trators to any particular benefits choice. Id. at 668.
81. 954 F.2d 299, 303-06 (5th Cir. 1992).
82. 906 F.2d 985, 987-88, 992-94 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 982 (1990).
83. 516 U.S. 489 (1996).
84. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b).
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claims to obtain individual rather than plan-wide relief.85 The Su-
preme Court held that beneficiaries could assert individual claims for
equitable relief under 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (a)(3)(B), which redresses
breaches of fiduciary duty provided that no "other appropriate equita-
ble relief' is available under any of ERISA's other civil enforcement
provisions.S6 Varity Corporation decided to transfer money-losing di-
visions of one of its subsidiaries to another.8 7 When it did this, Varity
Corporation tried to persuade employees of the failing divisions to
change employers and benefit plans.88 Varity Corporation assured
employees that their benefits would remain secure in the transfer.8 9
However, the employees who transferred lost their nonpension bene-
fits. Those employees sued Varity Corporation under ERISA claiming
that Varity purposefully misled them into forfeiting their benefits.90
The District Court found that Varity and the money-losing subsidiary
were fiduciaries under ERISA. By harming the employees, they vio-
lated their ERISA fiduciary duty.9 ' The Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals affirmed in relevant part.92 On certiorari, the United States
Supreme Court held that Varity was acting as a fiduciary when it pur-
posefully misled the employees about the security of their benefits be-
cause, in so doing, Varity exercised "discretionary authority" in the
administration of the employee benefit plan.93 Then, the Court found
that Varity breached its fiduciary duty because deceiving beneficiaries
to make money for the employer is not an action "solely in the interest
of the participants and beneficiaries." 94 Finally, the Court recognized
a fiduciary cause of action by individuals under ERISA.95
85. See 516 U.S. at 509-10. Courts have disputed whether ERISA's civil enforcement
provisions afford individual relief for fiduciary breaches. 29 U.S.C. § 1132
(a)(3)(B), [Section 502(a)(3)] provides:
A civil action may be brought-
(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or
practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of
the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress
such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the
terms of the plan.
Id.
86. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b).
87. See 516 U.S. 489, 493.
88. See id.
89. See 1d. at 494.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 495.
93. See id. at 502-05.
94. Id. at 506-07.
95. See id. at 507-515.
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The Court based its decision to recognize a fiduciary cause of action
under ERISA for individuals on § 502(a)(3) of ERISA,96 which allows
lawsuits for individual equitable relief for breach of fiduciary duties.
The Court distinguished its decision in Massachusetts Mutual Life In-
surance Co. v. Russell,97 where it held that § 502(a)(2) of ERISA98
does not provide individual relief. It reasoned that the restriction
under subsection (2) does not mean that such relief is not "appropri-
ate" under subsection (3).99 Since the Supreme Court's decision in
Varity, participants seeking individual relief for breaches of fiduciary
duty have flooded the courts.OO
For example, the Eighth Circuit held in Shea v. EsenstenlOl that
ERISA imposes a fiduciary duty on plan physicians and administra-
tors to disclose the existence and nature of financial incentives used to
affect physicians' medical decision-making.1O2 Shea died of heart fail-
ure just a few months after his doctor refused to refer Shea to a cardi-
ologist, despite warning signs that Shea's heart was diseased.103
Shea's widow sued the HMO for failure to disclose that it offered fi-
nancial incentives for physicians to limit care.10 4 Specifically, Shea's
HMO rewarded doctors for not making covered referrals to specialists
and the HMO reduced the doctors' fees if they made too many.1 05 The
court relied on Varity and held that HMOs must disclose to their pa-
tients the existence of financial incentives to limit care.106 It reasoned
that the fiduciary duty detailed by the Supreme Court in Varity
clearly could have included an obligation to disclose the "material fact"
of physician incentives.107
B. Case-in-Point
Cynthia Herdrich represents yet another patient who tried to as-
sert breach of fiduciary responsibility under ERISA after ERISA pre-
empted her other claims.1OS On March 1, 1991, Herdrich experienced
96. Codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (1994).
97. 473 U.S. 134 (1985).
98. Codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2) (1994).
99. See Varity, 516 U.S. at 495.
100. See Courts Dismiss Claims For Benefits Clothed as Breaches of Fiduciary Duty(McDermott, Will & Emery, ERISA Litigation Review)(visited July 12, 2000)
<http'//www.mwe.com/news/eris0398.htm>.
101. 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997).
102. See id. at 629.
103. See id. at 626.
104. See id. at 627.
105. See id.
106. See id. at 627-28.
107. See 107 F.3d 625, 628.
108. See Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362 (7th Cir. 1998), rev'd, Pegram v. Herdrich,
530 U.S. 211, 120 S. Ct. 2143 (2000).
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pain in the midline area of her groin.' 0 9 Herdrich visited her health
plan provider, Carle,11o where Dr. Lori Pegram examined her."' Six
days later, at a second exam, Dr. Pegram found an inflamed mass in
Herdrich's abdomen.112 Dr. Pegram decided that Herdrich would
have to wait eight more days before ordering an ultrasound to diag-
nose the problem.1 3 In so doing, Dr. Pegram ordered the procedure
at a facility staffed by Carle more than fifty miles away.1 14 Not even
eight days had passed when Herdrich's appendix ruptured.1 5 As a
result, Herdrich suffered the life-threatening condition, peritonitis,
which required additional surgery.16
Herdrich sued Dr. Pegram and her health plan provider, Carle, for
medical negligence in Illinois state court."T7 Later, she added two
counts of state-law fraud against Carle and Health Alliance Medical
Plans, Inc. ("HAMP").118 Carle contended that ERISA preempted the
fraud claims.11 9 Consequently, the district court removed the case to
federal court.120 Carle then sought summary judgment on the state-
law fraud counts. 12 1 The district court granted summary judgment to
Carle on the second state-fraud count, but granted Herdrich leave to
amend the other state-law fraud count. 12 2 In her amended complaint,
Herdrich alleged that the provision of medical services under the
terms of the Carle HMO plan, rewarding physician-owners who lim-
109. See id. at 365 n.1.
110. Petitioners, Carle Clinic Association, P.C., Health Alliance Medical Plans, Inc.,
and Carle Health Insurance Management Co., Inc. (collectively "Carle") were the
health maintenance organization ("HMO") that provided Herdrich with medical
care through her husband's employer, State Farm Insurance. Carle functions as
an RMO owned by physicians providing prepaid medical services to participants
whose employers contract with Carle for coverage. See id. at 365.
111. See id. at 365 n.1.
112. See id.
113. See id. at 374.
114. See id. Herdrich's health plan required patients in "non-emergency" situations to
receive care from facilities owned by the plan. Herdrich's health plan classified
her condition as a "non-emergency" and required that she visit a plan-owned fa-
cility fifty miles from her neighborhood hospital.
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See id. at 365. Although Dr. Pegram was listed as a petitioner, it was "unclear to
[the Court] that she retain[ed] a direct interest in the outcome of th[e] case.
Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, __, 120 S. Ct. 2143, 2144 n.1. (2000).
118. See Herdrich, 154 F.3d at 365.
119. See id.
120. See id. at 366. ERISA governs all benefit plans sponsored by employers. ERISA
broadly preempts state law actions in the area of employee benefits. See 29
U.S.C. § 1144(a).
121. See id.
122. See id. The district court granted summary judgment against Herdrich on Count
IV "to the extent [she] relies on 502(a)(3)(B) [of ERISA, codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 1132(a)(3)(B)l as a basis for monetary relief, as opposed to equitable relief." Id.
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ited medical care, constituted an anticipatory breach of an ERISA fi-
duciary duty.i123 In support, Herdrich reasoned that the plan's
contractual terms incited physicians to make decisions in their own
best interests, rather than in the exclusive interests of the patients
who participate in the plan, thus violating their fiduciary
responsibility.' 2 4
Despite Herdrich's new argument, the district court granted sum-
mary judgment to Carle, holding that Carle was never "involved [in
these events] as" an ERISA fiduciary.' 25 Herdrich prevailed, how-
ever, on her malpractice counts, receiving $35,000 for her injuries.i 2 6
Herdrich appealed the district court's dismissal of her ERISA-based
claim to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.1 27 The Seventh Circuit
reversed the district court's decision, holding that Carle was acting as
a fiduciary when its physician decided to postpone the needed
treatment.128
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals decision.' 2 9 It held that mixed eligibility and treat-
ment decisions by HMO physicians do not constitute fiduciary deci-
sions under ERISA.130 The Supreme Court supported incentive
schemes, emphasizing that no HMO would survive without incentives
connecting physician reward with treatment rationing.13 Thus, it re-
fused to distinguish between good and bad HMO incentive schemes,
noting such action would involve a judgment about the level of socially
123. See id. at 366 & n.3.
124. See id. The ERISA statute, under which Herdrich sought relief provides that:
Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of
the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by
this subchapter shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any
losses to the plan resulting from each such breach, and to restore to such
plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been made through use of
assets of the plan by the fiduciary, and shall be subject to such other
equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate, includ-
ing removal of such fiduciary.
29 U.S.C. § 1109(a).
125. Herdrich, 154 F.3d at 367.
126. See id. at 367.
127. See id.
128. See id. at 380. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that
[o]ur decision does not stand for the proposition that the existence of
incentives automatically gives rise to a breach of fiduciary duty. Rather,
we hold that incentives can rise to the level of a breach where, as
pleaded here, the fiduciary trust between plan participants and plan fi-
duciaries no longer exists (i.e., where physicians delay providing neces-
sary treatment to, or withhold administering proper care to, plan
beneficiaries for the sole purpose of increasing their bonuses).
Id. at 373.
129. See Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 120 S. Ct. 2143 (2000).
130. See 120 S. Ct. at 2155, 2158.
131. See id. at 2150.
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accepted medical risk for the sake of reducing cost.132 According to
the court, such a decision would turn on facts not readily available to
courts.1 3 3 Further, the Court explained that Congress had not in-
tended for an HMO to be treated as a fiduciary under ERISA when it
makes mixed eligibility and treatment decisions through its physi-
cians.1 34 It reasoned that trustees' duties under the common law of
trusts would be inconsistent with HMO physicians' duties because
HMO physicians may have to pay out money not in the best interest of
the beneficiary.' 35 It further reasoned that subjecting HIMOs to lim-
ited fiduciary liability as suggested by the Seventh Circuit would sim-
ply turn into a slippery slope of malpractice claims and undermine
their very purpose in the medical industry-to reduce medical
costs.1 3 6
III. ANALYSIS: THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
IN PEGRAM
The United States Supreme Court failed to exercise its authority
under ERISA when it refused to acknowledge a breach of fiduciary
duty by MCOs that financially induce physicians to deny needed
healthcare services.' 3 7 In so doing, the Court wiggled its way through
ERISA's broad language dodging the profoundly important cause of
action.138
The Supreme Court in Pegram held that mixed treatment and eli-
gibility decisions do not constitute fiduciary decisions under ER-
ISA.i39 In support of its decision, the Court reasoned that Congress
132. See id. at 2150-51.
133. See id. at 2150, 2157.
134. See id. at 2155.
135. See id. at 2155-56.
136. See id. at 2157-58.
137. See Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal,
463 U.S. 1, 24 n.26 (1983)(quoting 120 Cong. Rec. 29, 942 (1974)(statement of
Sen. Javits))(noting that ERISA's legislative history suggests that "a body of
[iflederal substantive law will be developed by the courts to deal with issues in-
volving rights and obligations under private welfare and pension plans").
138. See Pittman, supra note 8, at 357 (noting that the "Court has punched a zone of
no liability for negligent acts committed while under an ERISA plan in an impor-
tant federal statute that affects the lives of millions of employees and benefi-
ciaries" when it refused "to exercise its authority under ERISA to create federal
common law remedies to replace preempted state laws.")
139. See Pegram, 530 U.S. at -, 120 S. Ct. at 2143. The Court defined pure "eligibil-
ity decisions" as decisions regarding the "plan's coverage of a particular condition
or medical procedure for its treatment." 120 S. Ct. at 2154. The Court defined
"W[treatment decisions" as "choices about how to go about diagnosing and treating
a patient's condition: given a patient's constellation of symptoms, what is the
appropriate medical response?" Id. The Court further stated that treatment and
eligibility decisions are "practically inextricable from one another." Id. The
Court alluded to the fact that pure eligibility decisions could be considered fiduci-
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had not intended to treat HMOs as ERISA fiduciaries to the extent
that they make mixed eligibility decisions through their physicians.i 4o
The Supreme Court's decision in Pegram, however, defied the very
purpose behind ERISA by exposing beneficiaries to administrative
funding abuses. As discussed below, the Court's decision to shield
MCOs from fiduciary liability flies in the face of ERISA's text and leg-
islative history, traditional fiduciary obligations adopted by ERISA,
and ERISA's expansive preemptive authority.
A. ERISA's Text and Legislative History Manifests Congress'
Intent for Courts to Hold MCOs Liable as ERISA
Fiduciaries
1. MCOs Constitute Fiduciaries Under ERISA
According to the plain text of ERISA, a "fiduciary" is someone act-
ing in the capacity of manager, administrator, or financial adviser to
the extent that they exercise "any discretionary authority or discre-
tionary responsibility in the administration" of an ERISA plan.141 In
light of this statutory language, courts have interpreted "fiduciary"
functionally, rather than formally, in terms of the party's control and
authority over the plan and benefits.142 Pursuant to this functional
interpretation, federal courts have found that an MCO exercising dis-
cretion and control over the administration or management of the ben-
efits plan acts as a fiduciary for purposes of ERISA.i43 An MCO
ary in nature, but that Herdrich failed to allege any breach of a pure eligibility
decision. See id.
140. See id. at 2155. When an MCO induces physicians to limit patient care through
financial incentive schemes, physicians must inherently make decisions that con-
stitute both the practice of medicine (treatment decisions) and discretionary ad-
ministration of plan benefits (eligibility decisions). Normally, physicians would
only be held to making treatment decisions, but financial incentives place an ad-
ditional burden on physicians to reduce costs as well, which goes to eligibility
decisions, not care decisions.
141. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(21)(A)(i)-(iii). These sections provide that:
Except as otherwise provided in subparagraph (B), a person is a fiduci-
ary with respect to a plan to the extent (i) he exercises any discretionary
authority or discretionary control respecting management of such plan
or exercises any authority or control respecting management or disposi-
tion of its assets,.. .or (iii) he has any discretionary authority or respon-
sibility in the administration of such plan.
Id.
142. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 262 (1993)(establishing that the test
for determining whether a given person or entity is a fiduciary with respect to the
plan hinges on the person's or entity's actions and not the official designation of
the person or entity's role).
143. See, e.g., Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 628-29 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522
U.S. 914 (1997); O'Reilly v. Ceuleers, 912 F.2d 1383, 1385 (11th Cir. 1990); Weiss
v. CIGNA Healthcare, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 748, 751 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
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exercises its "discretionary authority" or "responsibility" when it de-
termines whether a patient is entitled to healthcare benefits.44
In addition to its text, ERISA's legislative history confirms that
Congress purposefully construed ERISA's interpretation of "fiduciary"
liberally to encompass MCOs.14s Chairman of the House Committee
on Education and Labor in 1974 recited the following broad interpre-
tation of "fiduciary:"
The Committee has adopted the view that the definition of fiduciary is of ne-
cessity broad.... A fiduciary need not be a person with direct access to the
assets of the plan.... Conduct alone may in appropriate circumstances im-
pose fiduciary obligations. It is the clear intention of the Committee that any
person with a specific duty imposed upon him by this statute be deemed to be
a fiduciary.1 4 6
Still, courts do not need to interpret "fiduciary" broadly to merely
apply the fiduciary status to MCOs. As stated, a "fiduciary" exercises
discretionary authority over a plan.147 MCOs by their very nature
make discretionary plan decisions when they determine which tests or
treatments are appropriate for a particular patient in a particular sit-
uation.148 These discretionary activities are precisely the kind to
which the traditional fiduciary standard of responsibility applies.149
At the time Congress enacted ERISA, it could not have envisioned
the specific provisions required to protect consumers of managed
health care from dangerous cost-saving innovations.15 0 Congress ac-
cordingly drafted ERISA with broad language to allow courts to con-
tinually interpret ERISA to best effectuate Congress' intent of
protecting beneficiaries from funding abuses.151 One commentator
even noted that the body of law governing fiduciaries in particular
144. See cases cited supra note 143.
145. Although ERISA's legislative history did not specifically mention MCOs, com-
mentators have determined that because of its broad, encompassing language,
Congress intended for ERISA to adapt to the changes in the medical system. See
Dahlia Schwartz, Breathing Lessons for the ERISA Vacuum: Toward a Reconcili-
ation of ERISA's Competing Objectives in the Health Benefits Arena, 79 B.U. L.
REv. 631 (1999)(discussing the broad language of ERISA and the need for courts
to interpret it according to congressional intent).
146. Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362, 370 (7th Cir. 1998)(quoting 120 CONG. REC.
3977, 3983 (daily ed. Feb. 25, 1974))(statement of Chairman of the House Com-
mittee on Education and Labor, reprinted in 2 LEGIsLATvE HISTORY OF THE EM-
PLOYiENT REnzEAmiNT INcom. SECURTY ACT OF 1974, at 3293).
147. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
148. See Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321, 1330 n.13 (5th Cir.
1992)(noting that discretionary authority over the management of the plan satis-
fies the statutory definition of fiduciary).
149. See Libbey-Owens-Ford Co. v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield Mutual of Ohio, 982
F.2d 1031, 1035 (6th Cir. 1993).
150. See Marsh, supra note 27, at 1337.
151. See Schwartz, supra note 145, at 638 (explaining that courts construing an am-
biguous statute, such as ERISA, must look first to congressional intent).
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should evolve to fit changes in societal structure. 152 Physician incen-
tive schemes pose a perfect example of an unforeseen threat to the
quality of healthcare.1 53 Accordingly, Congress would effectuate its
purpose of protecting beneficiaries from funding abuses by recognizing
MCOs as having a fiduciary responsibility to its patients. Accord-
ingly, Congress could ensure that MCOs implementing incentive
schemes would not sacrifice patient care in their attempt to maximize
profits.
2. Financial Incentive Schemes Imposed on Physicians
Constitute a Breach of MCOs' Fiduciary Duties
Under ERISA, plan fiduciaries must act "solely in the interest of
the participants and beneficiaries" and for the "exclusive purpose" of
"providing benefits" and "defraying reasonable expenses of adminis-
tering the plan."1 54 Courts have interpreted these fiduciary require-
ments as codifying the common law duty of loyalty imposed by trust
law.15 5 In a fiduciary relationship, the beneficiary depends on the fi-
duciary for a particular service.1 56 Fiduciary relations are designed
only to satisfy the beneficiary's needs.1 5 7 Thus, there is an inherent
duty of loyalty to the beneficiary who has entrusted valuable rights to
a fiduciary for protection.
The fiduciary responsibility plays an important role in America's
medical industry. Fiduciaries must act in the interest of their benefi-
ciaries, which empowers them to use their discretion to decide which
of the beneficiaries' risks they should assume.15 8 In the medical in-
dustry, this translates into health care administrators looking out for
its patients' best interests. The fiduciary responsibility is essential to
maintain patients' trust in their health care administrator, which ben-
efits society by encouraging patients to utilize preventative methods of
care. Thus, to maintain the essential fiduciary role in the medical in-
dustry, the health care administrators must respond to the changes in
the medical industry-especially the entity most in control of ad-
152. See Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 798 (1983)(stating that
"[1law should reflect the changes in societal structure. Thus, a major reason for
recognizing and developing a separate body of fiduciary law is that our society is
evolving into one based predominantly on fiduciary relations. The body of law
governing fiduciary relations can affect and be affected by this social trend.").
153. See Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat'l Health Plan, 999 F.2d 298 (8th Cir. 1993)(noting that
an incentive structure where an HMO pays bonuses to physicians who refrain
from ordering "unwarranted" diagnostic tests may affect the quantity and quality
of benefits provided to a patient under a plan).
154. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1).
155. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 506 (1995).
156. See Frankel, supra note 152, at 800-801.
157. See id.
158. See id. at 812.
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ministering health care services. Under managed care, MCOs are
most in control of administering health care services due to their con-
tractual relationship with both physician employees and the em-
ployer-sponsored benefit plans. Subjecting MCOs to fiduciary
responsibility would make MCOs accountable for their decisions as
health care administrator, a principle of liability well established in
the medical industry.
Trust law requires courts to grant a high degree of deference to
fiduciaries' decisions under the assumption that the fiduciary is look-
ing out for the best interest of its beneficiary.159 This level of defer-
ence does not apply if a beneficiary can show that the fiduciary acted
under a conflict of interest or that the governing law did not, in fact,
grant discretionary power to the fiduciary.160 Because MCOs are in
business to make money, it is reasonable for courts to presume that
MCOs administering employee benefit plans will face a conflict of in-
terest in carrying out their duty of loyalty to their patients.161 It is
likely that MCOs as ERISA plan fiduciaries will not act with the indi-
vidual beneficiary's best interests in mind when confronted with the
decision of whether to authorize a costly but uncertain treatment.1 62
This is because the managed care employment contract with physi-
cians often holds physicians financially responsible for exceeding the
capitation limit. Financial incentives imposed on physicians create a
very serious conflict between the physician's financial self-interest
and the medical interest of the patient. Financial incentives impose a
tangible barrier to providing care with an "eye single" to the interest
of the beneficiaries.163 The Supreme Court abdicated its judicial law-
making power by not recognizing this as a breach of ERISA's fiduciary
duty.
B. Fiduciary Obligations Apply to MCOs Whose Physicians
Make Mixed Eligibility Decisions as a Result of
Financial Incentive Schemes
The United States Supreme Court in Pegram doubted that Con-
gress would have perceived mixed eligibility and treatment decisions
as fiduciary decisions when it enacted ERISA.164 The Supreme
Court's doubt arose from the differences between common law trust-
159. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989)(establishing
the standard of review for benefit denial cases).
160. See id.
161. See Shea v. Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 628 (8th Cir. 1997) (stating that the patient
must be informed of whether the advice from her doctor is influenced by self-
serving financial considerations created by the MCO).
162. See Schwartz, supra note 145, at 657.
163. See Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 271 (2d Cir. 1982).
164. See Pegram, 520 U.S. 211, -, 120 S. Ct. 2143, 2155 (2000).
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ees and MCOs.165 The Pegram Court noted that the payment of
money in the interest of the beneficiary was the common law trustee's
most defining concern.1 66 Accordingly, the Court distinguished the
two by noting that MCOs making mixed eligibility decisions do not
only pay out money, they consume money as well.167 The Court fur-
ther noted that even when MCOs do pay out money, they do not al-
ways do it exclusively in the interest of their beneficiaries.1 68 The
Court concluded that because trust law does not allow fiduciaries to
have interests adverse to their beneficiaries,1 69 fiduciary obligations
under the law of trust do not apply to MCOs whose physicians make
mixed eligibility decisions.1o
The Court's reasoning overlooks Congress' intent to draw a consid-
erable amount, but not all of the ERISA fiduciary material from trust
law.171 While Congress has required courts to examine trust princi-
ples in determining a party's fiduciary status under ERISA,172 Con-
gress has also expected courts to interpret ERISA's fiduciary
standards bearing in mind the special nature and purpose of employee
benefit plans.' 7 3 Courts must acknowledge that the system of man-
aged care has influenced the special nature of employee health bene-
fits.174 The cost-conscious structure of managed care has influenced
165. See 120 S. Ct. at 2155-56.
166. See id.
167. See id. When an MCO induces physicians to limit patient care through financial
incentive schemes, physicians must inherently make decisions that constitute
both the practice of medicine (treatment decisions) and discretionary administra-
tion of plan benefits (eligibility decisions). Treatment decisions have historically
been based on the best interest of the beneficiary, while eligibility decisions have
historically been based on cost-containment factors.
168. See id. at 2156. The Supreme Court admitted that ERISA is rooted in the com-
mon law of trusts, but reasoned that MCOs have interests adverse to their benefi-
ciaries, and therefore, could not constitute "fiduciaries" under trust law. Id. at
2152.
169. See NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 329-330 (1981) (stating that the com-
mon law of trusts prohibits fiduciaries from holding positions that create conflict
of interest with trust beneficiaries).
170. See Pegram, 120 S. Ct. at 2158.
171. See S. REP. No. 93-127 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4865 ("[tlhe
fiduciary responsibility section, in essence, codifies and make applicable to these
fiduciaries certain principles developed in the evolution of the law of trusts");
Varity, 516 U.S. at 496; Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension
Fund v. Central Transport, Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 570 (1985).
172. See Varity, 516 U.S. at 506 (noting the relationship between the common law of
trusts and ERISA's fiduciary duties).
173. See id. at 497 (stating that Congress "expected that the courts will interpret this
prudent man rule (and the other fiduciary standards) bearing in mind the special
nature and purpose of employee benefit plans," as they "develop a 'federal com-
mon law of rights and obligations under ERISA-regulated plans.'")(quoting Fire-
stone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 110-11 (1989)(quoting Pilot Life
Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987))).
174. See supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
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the special nature of employee benefits by forcing MCO physicians to
perform the dual role of plan administrator and medical care pro-
vider.' 7 5 Even though the conflict between the goals of ERISA and
managed care seems to immunize MCOs from liability, Congress did
not intend to totally immunize MCOs from liability solely because
managed care's goals have conflicted with those of ERISA.176
Courts must examine trust law fiduciary obligations in the context
of employee benefit plans only to the extent that the MCOs are acting
in their fiduciary capacity.177 MCOs may perform different activities
that do not rise to the level of fiduciary.' 7 8 When exercising these
roles, MCOs need not concern themselves with whether they are act-
ing adversely to their beneficiaries' interests. 7 9 Only when MCOs
make discretionary decisions must MCOs' activities align with the in-
terests of their beneficiaries.' 8 0 Thus, the liability of fiduciaries under
the law of trusts applies to MCOs, but only to the extent they act as
fiduciaries. The Court, therefore, seemed to erroneously presume the
inapplicability of fiduciary obligations to MCOs solely because their
fiduciary responsibilities have been entangled with nonfiduciary activ-
ities. As such, the Court ignored congressional intent to interpret the
ERISA fiduciary concept broadly to include MCOs, abdicating its judi-
cial law-making authority under ERISA.
C. ERISA's Broad Preemptive Effect Undermines the
Court's Justification for Immunizing MCOs from
Liability
The Supreme Court further supported its decision to confer no fed-
eral fiduciary cause of action against MCOs under ERISA by noting
that beneficiaries can resolve their claims through an alternative
venue - state court.' 8 ' While beneficiaries can still impose some state
175. See Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 361 (3d Cir. 1995)(discussing the
dual treatment/eligibility roles of HMOs).
176. See supra notes 44-52 and accompanying text.
177. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)(defining administrator as a fiduciary only "to the ex-
tent" that he or she acts in a fiduciary capacity in relation to a plan).
178. See Pegram, 120 S. Ct. at 2152 (stating that "[elmployers, for example, can be
ERISA fiduciaries and still take actions to the disadvantage of employee benefi-
ciaries" such as "firing a beneficiary for reasons unrelated to the ERISA plan.").
179. See Schwartz, supra note 145, at 656 (stating that ERISA fiduciaries need not
comply with fiduciary responsibilities when creating, altering, and terminating
benefit plans).
180. See HENRY H. PERRrTr, JR., HEALTH CARE LEGISLATION UPDATE AND ANALYSIS, 58-
59 (1995).
181. See Pegram, 120 S. Ct. at 2145.
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claims against physicians,1S2 the Court's reasoning ignores ERISA's
expansive preemptive power.
ERISA contains an explicit preemption clause, which provides, in
pertinent part, "[e]xcept as provided in subsection (b) of this section,
the provisions of this subchapter III of this chapter shall supercede
any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to
any employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a)...."18 3 Con-
gress did not specify the scope of "relate to," leaving it ambiguous. 1 4
Thus, pursuant to Congress' intent to interpret ERISA's language lib-
erally, the Supreme Court has held that ERISA's preemption should
be defined broadly.15
Federal courts followed the Supreme Court by interpreting the
words "relate to" beyond the preemption of state laws relating solely to
the specific subjects of ERISA, such as reporting, disclosure, and fidu-
ciary obligations.iS6 These courts have construed the phrase more ex-
pansively to include state laws that merely have "a connection with or
reference to such a plan."1 7 In other words, courts have looked be-
yond the specific duties Congress enumerated in ERISA as being
preemptable, and have found that ERISA preempts almost any state
law that has anything to do with an employee benefit plan. Because
many employers contract with MCOs to provide their employees
health care services, courts have consistently found that those con-
tracts qualify as employee benefit plans under ERISA.18 Thus, al-
most anyone who qualifies as a beneficiary of an employee benefit
plan will have his or her claims against the MCO preempted by
ERISA.
Not only do most plans administered by MCOs qualify as employee
benefit plans, but also a majority of Americans qualify as ERISA bene-
182. See Joanne B. Stem, Malpractice in the Managed Care Industry, 24 CREIGHTON
L. REv. 1285 (1991)(describing the various forms of state liability imposed on
MCOs).
183. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829, 897 (1974)(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(a)(1994)(emphasis added). According to section 514(c)(1), codified as 29
U.S.C. § 1133(c)(1), the term "State law" includes all laws, decisions, rules, regu-
lations, or other State action having the effect of law, of any State. Section
514(b)(2)(A), codified as 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A), exempts certain state laws
from preemption.
184. See Schwartz, supra note 145, at 638 (explaining that "the inherent tension be-
tween the goal of national uniformity of benefit regulation and the need to protect
beneficiaries has forced courts to interpret ERISA as if it were an ambiguous
statute)(quoting Travelers, 514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995)("we must simply go beyond
[ERISA'sl unhelpful text")).
185. See Shaw, 463 U.S. at 97 (stating that a law relates to a plan if it has "a connec-
tion with or reference to a plan" and is preempted even if it is consistent with
ERISA and only indirectly affects employee benefits plans).
186. See discussion supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
187. See Shaw, 463 U.S. at 85.
188. See discussion of ERISA preemption supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
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ficiaries as well, because over one half of Americans now receive their
health care through ERISA regulated plans.' 8 9 ERISA preempts
Americans' claims against their MCOs simply because they qualify as
beneficiaries, leaving them unprotected by state-enforced consumer
laws.190 Beneficiaries must instead resort to the options under fed-
eral law, options that do not include suing MCOs who induce physi-
cians to deny care.191
Opponents of creating a cause of action against MCOs under ER-
ISA argue that the Supreme Court has since retreated from the very
expansive interpretation of the "relates to" language.' 92 They argue
that more recent courts have held that state law will control claims
against MCOs for negligence or low quality of care.193 However,
courts have still preempted direct liability claims against MCOs.' 94
Courts have even recently begun recognizing vicarious liability claims
against MCOs.' 95 These opponents contend that by recognizing vica-
rious liability, courts have supplied the necessary cause of action
against MCOs under ERISA.196 Thus, they argue that ERISA's
"overly broad" preemption clause no longer requires imposing the ad-
ditional direct liability claims against MCOs.1 97
The opponents' argument, however, fails to recognize that by en-
tangling medical and eligibility decisions, MCOs have made it nearly
189. See Paul Fronstein, Employment-Based Health Insurance: A Look at Tax Issues
and Public Opinion, 211 EBRI: Issue Brief 3 (1999) (stating that 64.2% of non-
elderly Americans receive their health insurance through an employer).
190. See Roland, supra note 5, at 1499.
191. See Richards, supra note 18, at 223 (stating that the "central regulatory issue for
MCOs is that they are generally exempt from the states' existing system of regu-
lation insurance because of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(TRISA')").
192. See New York State Conf. of Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
193. See Corporate Health Insurance, Inc., v. Montemayor, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS
14215, at *14 (5th Cir., June 20, 2000).
194. See Schwartz, supra note 145, at 652 (citing Richard C. Reuben, In Pursuit of
Health, 82 A.B.A. J. 54, 57 (1996)) (defining direct liability as "negligence com-
mitted in the course of administering the benefit plan itself was the proximate
cause of the plaintiffs harm.").
195. See, e.g., Tolton, 48 F.3d at 943 (holding that wrongful death claims were pre-
empted by ERISA because the plan accused was involved in benefit determina-
tions, recognizing ERISA preemption left participant without meaningful
remedies); Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1321 (holding that ERISA preempted wrongful
death action for failing to provide adequate benefit coverage); cf Jass v. Pruden-
tial Health Care Plan, Inc., 88 F.3d 1482 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding alleged vicari-
ous liability claims against managed care organization not preempted);
PacifiCare of Okla., Inc., 59 F.3d 151, 155 (10th Cir. 1995)(holding that ERISA
did not preempt a medical malpractice claim against an HMO alleged to be vicar-
iously liable for the malpractice of its physician).
196. See Noah, supra note 10, at 1243-44.
197. See Roland, supra note 5, at 1501.
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impossible to differentiate vicarious from direct liability claims.19s A
direct liability claim against an MCO for denial of treatment based on
cost concerns rather than on medical concerns is virtually the same as
a vicarious liability claim based on denial of treatment by an MCO
physician with poor medical judgment. Each utilize two different
methods, but they penalize the same entity. However, ERISA
preempts the direct claim, while patients asserting the vicarious lia-
bility claim can proceed with a medical malpractice claim in state
court.19 9
Moreover, preemption is still very likely in negligence suits linked
to financial incentives. 20 0 ERISA will preempt any claim that chal-
lenges the amount of benefits received or administered under an em-
ployee benefit plan.2 01 Thus, the only tenable claim available against
HMOs under ERISA is for breach of fiduciary duty,2 02 which the Su-
preme Court erroneously failed to acknowledge.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE SUPREME COURTS ABDICATION
ON THE FUTURE OF THE MEDICAL INDUSTRY
A. Immunizing MCOs from Liability Will Reduce the Quality
of Healthcare Services
The actual accomplishments of the managed care system have
fallen short of the goals envisioned by Congress in the early 1970s.20 3
While Congress expected the competitive arrangements of MCOs to
improve the cost efficiency of care, it simultaneously hoped to improve
the quality of care.20 4 In reality, MCOs have not even achieved sub-
stantial cost efficiencies. 205 And, as growing numbers of patients re-
198. See Wendy K. Mariner, Liability for Managed Care Decisions: The Employee Re-
tirement Income Security Act (ERISA) and the Uneven Playing Field, 86 Am. J.
PuB. HEALTH 863, 864 (1996).
199. See discussion supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
200. See Roland, supra note 5, at 1500 (discussing how ERISA preempts negligence
suits for denials of care linked to financial incentives).
201. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 125-33
(1992)(holding a municipal law requiring employer to provide health insurance
while on workers' compensation comparable to while working was preempted).
202. See Schwartz, supra note 145, at 635 (arguing that courts could better serve ER-
ISA's objectives by enforcing the fiduciary obligations ERISA imposes on plan
administrators).
203. See Clark C. Havighurst, Vicarious Liability: Relocating Responsibility for the
Quality of Medical Care, 26 AM. J. L. & MED. 7, 10 (2000).
204. See id.
205. See Pittman, supra note 8, at 363 (citing Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Rationing
Health Care: The Unnecessary Solution, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1525, 1526
(1992))(noting that although one study has shown that cost-cutting strategies of
MCOs have reduced certain types of health care costs, health care costs continue
to rise).
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ceive health care services from MCOs, patients have increasingly
criticized the quality of care provided by these organizations. 20 6
Pegram represents only one of a long line of catastrophes manifest-
ing the seriousness of the injuries suffered by patients as a result of
financial incentive arrangements. In Lancaster v. Kaiser Foundation
Health Plan,2 0 7 an eleven-year-old child who showed symptoms of"in-
tense, localized headaches, vomiting, and blood-shot eyes," was denied
necessary tests after visiting Kaiser's clinic for diagnosis. The physi-
cian prescribed pain medication, but did not refer the child to a neu-
rologist.2 0s Four and one half years after her initial visit, the child
was found to have a brain tumor that had displaced forty percent of
her brain.2 09 The court indicated that the financial incentive program
that paid physicians bonuses for avoiding excessive treatments and
tests financially motivated this malpractice. 2 o In order to reduce
such negligent medical treatment and improve the quality of care, so-
ciety must hold MCOs liable for inducing physicians to cut costs
through financial incentive arrangements.
Proponents of the managed care system, however, emphasize the
need to implement physician incentives to control the rising costs of
healthcare despite quality concerns. 21 1 These proponents argue that
physician incentives have successfully induced physicians to reduce
costs by limiting care. They argue that cost containment, not quality,
should be society's overriding concern. 2 12 According to these commen-
tators, imposing tort liability on MCOs would undermine the purpose
of managed care to decrease costs.2 13 Society, however, should mis-
trust corporate entities that lack legal responsibility for the quality of
care. 2 14
The consequences of Congress immunizing MCOs from liability
under ERISA, in light of the consequences if Congress allowed the cost
of health care to escalate freely, fosters the need to strike an appropri-
206. See Stuart Auerbach, Managed Care Backlash: As Marketplace Changes, Con-
sumers are Caught in the Middle, WAsH. PosT., June 25, 1996, at Z12 (discussing
study reporting that 53% of respondents felt that the healthcare system was get-
ting worse while only 38% believed it was improving).
207. 958 F. Supp. 1137 (E.D. Va. 1997).
208. See id. at 1139.
209. See id. at 1140.
210. See id.
211. See Robert J. Herrington, Herdrich v. Pegram, ERISA Fiduciary Liability and
Physician Incentives to Deny Care, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 715, 755 (2000); Noah,
supra note 8, at 1263-64.
212. See Marsh, supra note 27, at 1331.
213. See generally Battaglia, supra note 38.
214. See Havighurst, supra note 203, at 11.
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ate balance to avoid them both.215 Fiduciary tort liability strikes the
best balance between cost containment and quality maintenance.21 6
The threat of fiduciary liability will force MCOs to consider quality
standards in the treatment of patients. At the same time, imposing a
fiduciary standard of accountability will only increase costs if mal-
practice results. Thus, society can maintain MCOs' competitive struc-
ture without sacrificing patient well-being in the name of profit.
MCOs will be mindful that too much focus on profit instead of care will
undermine the actualization of profits, since liability costs money.
Without liability to offset the cost-containment goals, the healthcare
system would lack checks and balances to protect the vulnerable pa-
tient. Lower health costs will provide little benefit unless the system
can simultaneously maintain a reasonable standard of quality.
It seems that Congress always intended quality to override con-
cerns of cost-containment under ERISA. While some commentators
argue that Congress gave no thought to the competing objectives of
ERISA and the HMOA,217 ERISA's legislative history indicates that
Congress attempted to reconcile the two statutes' potentially conflict-
ing purposes. In fact, the House Committee on Education and Labor
acknowledged that effectuating the primary purpose of ERISA - to
protect beneficiaries from the potential funding abuses of plan admin-
istrators-would result in "modest cost increases" to the health care
system.218 In other words, Congress recognized that it would be im-
possible to protect the interests of beneficiaries without cost. Yet, it
seems that Congress supported those cost increases because of the im-
portance of protecting beneficiaries under ERISA. Thus, Congress
215. See id. at 10 ("Public policy has not yet hit upon an approach that will cause
health plans and their subcontractors to concern themselves with quality in
health care as much as they do currently, and controversially, about cost.").
216. See Roland, supra note 5, at 1524 (stating that '[negligence suits provide an im-
portant counterbalance to MCO's financial incentive schemes that could entice
physicians to make self-serving, potentially detrimental, health-care decisions.").
217. See Marsh, supra note 27, at 1336 (stating that "[als forward-looking as ERISA
was at the time it was written, it does not specifically address the unique
problems raised by the managed care industry.").
218. See id. (citing HousE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT
INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1874, H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at 1 (1974), reprinted in
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639). The House Committee on Education and Labor, to
which the ERISA bill was initially referred for consideration, stated:
The primary purpose of the bill is the protection of individual pension
rights, but the committee has been constrained to recognize the volun-
tary nature of private retirement plans. The relative improvements re-
quired by this Act have been weighed against the additional burdens to
be placed on the system. While modest cost increases are to be antici-
pated when the Act becomes effective, the adverse impact of these in-
creases has been minimized.
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would not favor cutting costs under the managed care system to the
extent that the cuts would harm beneficiaries.
Today, the cost-cutting methods of the managed care system do, in
fact, harm beneficiaries' interests. Therefore, courts must choose to
protect beneficiaries' interests over saving marginal costs to effectuate
Congress' intent. Congress made clear that it favored quality of care
over marginal cost-containment. By acknowledging this potential cost
increase, Congress indicated that it did not want cost concerns of the
HMOA to overshadow ERISA's primary purpose to protect the quality
of services provided to beneficiaries. Thus, the Court's decision in
Pegram manifests misplaced concerns about the cost containment
goals of managed care.
B. Allowing MCOs to Administer Financial Incentives to
Their Physicians Will Lead to Adverse Selection of
Patients
Financial incentives enable MCOs to shift the obligation of control-
ling costs to physicians. 2 19 In light of this financial pressure to con-
tain costs, physicians could choose to care only for patients who
require inexpensive treatments. Physicians may also avoid treating
those who consume the most healthcare services. 22 0 These people
consist of the most vulnerable members of our society-the elderly,
the chronically ill and the poor.2 21 As such, financial incentives poten-
tially endanger the availability of healthcare to all Americans, under-
mining the result of managed care's ancillary goal - to afford more
Americans access to health care.22 2 The healthy and employed may
be the only ones to benefit from the privatization of the health care
system.
Physicians who reject "high risk" patients merely because they
may jeopardize a health care provider's ability to reach its profit goals
engage in adverse selection. Adverse selection harms society - espe-
219. See Schwartz, supra note 145, at 632.
220. See Roland, supra note 5, at 1524, 1525 (stating that "provider incentives de-
signed to promote cost-effective care could become incentives to stop providing
care to high-risk populations if the incentives are universally applied without
essential modifications.").
221. See id. at 1524; see also Health Care Financing Administration, Fact Sheet (vis-
ited Nov. 9, 2000) <http:/www.hcfa.gov/facts/f9702a.htm> (noting that "[iun fiscal
year 1996, HCFA (Health Care Financing Administration) spent an estimated
$359.4 billion to finance care services to elderly, disabled, and poor Americans in
the Medicare and Medicaid programs.").
222. See H.R. Rep. No. 93-533 at 1 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4676-
77 (quoting the House Committee on Ways and Means, to which the bill was
referred to amend the Internal Revenue Code)("In broad outline, the objective is
to increase the number of individuals participating in employer-financed
plans....").
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cially in service industries where there is a disparity of knowledge be-
tween the provider and the recipient. This disparity forces the
recipient to almost blindly rely on the decisions of the provider. The
health care industry presents one such situation of trust between pro-
vider and patient. Patients must rely on physicians for medical care
due to the patient's limited skill and knowledge of medical issues.
Managed care compounds the problem when it forces physicians to
make mixed treatment and eligibility decisions. Managed care physi-
cians may deny treatment for eligibility reasons, even though the pa-
tient relies on the physician's medical judgment to make what seems
to be a treatment decision. The essential relationship of trust between
provider and patient is harmed when patients rely on a physician who
denies them treatment for eligibility reasons. 22 3 MCOs will attest
that the patient's symptoms do not require treatment, when in reality
they are claiming patient "ineligibility" under the plan. To make mat-
ters worse, because most employees get their health benefits through
their employers, the patient will most likely have to sue in federal
court under ERISA because his or her claim will "relate to" his or her
employee benefit plan. Thus, insulating MCOs from liability under
ERISA, courts have opened the door for MCOs to adversely select
patients.
Some commentators contend that physicians should be able to re-
fuse expensive treatments to patients who need them under a "cost
defense" argument. Commentators have advocated asserting the cost
defense so physicians can avoid the high personal cost of potential
medical malpractice suits. 2 24 Yet, the cost defense represents an
emerging abuse of MCOs' leverage to adversely select patients.22 5 Es-
sentially, the cost defense enables physicians to claim that limited re-
sources render them financially unable to provide the care
required.2 26 In essence, where administrators force physicians to
make both eligibility and treatment decisions, physicians assert the
cost defense to rationalize denying treatment to at-risk patients.
The cost defense also enables physicians abuse their enhanced bar-
gaining power because it dangerously encourages physicians to rede-
223. See infra Section IV.C for discussion.
224. See generally John J. Howard, Medical Malpractice Liability and Cost Contain-
ment: Law and Economics in Conflict, 43 FoOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 309, 329
(1988)(arguing that "[t]he unfairness of such liability [for treatment decisions
based on cost] could be mitigated by allowing physicians an explicit cost-based
defense").
225. But cf Noah, supra note 10, at 1251 (arguing that the "cost defense" seems ide-
ally suited to application in the managed care context).
226. See id.
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fine what constitutes "medically necessary" treatment. 22 7 Physicians
have a duty to provide all "medically necessary" treatment to patients.
However, physicians could simply redefine "medically necessary" in
the face of financial restraints that compel the physicians to deny
treatment. Physicians hide their true financial motivation to deny
treatment in an effort to "escape the constant recognition that finan-
cial limits compel them to do less than their best."228 Although these
physicians claim that they denied treatment because the patient's con-
dition did not make treatment "medically necessary," in reality they
denied treatment because determining that the patient was eligible
for care would increase the physician's cost of doing business.
C. Allowing Financial Incentive Arrangements Threatens
Physicians' Duty of Loyalty to Their Patients
Financial incentive schemes have made it easy for MCOs to shift
the financial risk of health care to physicians. 2 29 When MCOs offer
physicians financial incentives to control costs, however, they obligate
physicians to make plan eligibility decisions that conflict with the
physician's traditional obligation to act in the best interest of their
patient.2 30
This conflict endangers the patients' rightful access to lifesaving
medical interventions by motivating physicians to compromise the
quality of care for an increase in profit.2 31 In so doing, MCOs have
perverted the core principles of the traditional practice of medicine by
allowing physicians to take their own financial well being into consid-
eration when making treatment decisions.
When Congress proposed to change the healthcare system to re-
duce costs and afford more people access to treatment, Congress did
not intend to undermine a physician's ethical responsibility to her pa-
tients.23 2 If it had, Congress would have taken upon itself to change
the 2500-year-old Hippocratic ethic of physician loyalty to patients!23 3
227. See generally Mark A. Hall & Gerard F. Anderson, Health Insurers'Assessment of
Medical Necessity, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1637, 1654 (1992)(referring generally to
medically necessary treatment).
228. Norman G. Levinsky, The Doctor's Master, 311 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1573, 1574
(1984)(quoting H.J. AARON & W.B. SCHWARTZ, THE PAiNFUL PRESCRIPTION: RA-
TIONING HosPrrA. CARE (1984)).
229. See Marsh supra note 27, at 1341.
230. Id. at 1324-25 (quoting Levinsky, supra note 229, at 1573)([p]hysicians are re-
quired to do everything that they believe may benefit each patient without regard
to costs or other societal considerations.").
231. See Marsh, supra note 27, at 1324.
232. See Roland, supra note 5, at 1488, 1493 (stating that managed care took over
much of the American health insurance and that ERISA contained "[nlo express
Congressional intent to affect, or especially to protect health insurers.").
233. See COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JuDIcIAL AFFAIRS, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, CUR-
RENT OPINIONS wrrH ANNOTATIONS, at x (1996-1997)(stating that the Oath of Hip-
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Obviously, Congress did not intend to do that. In reality, Congress
exercised incredible foresight by passing ERISA, which acknowledged
the climactic pervasiveness of employee benefit plans.23 4 Congress
recognized the need to protect beneficiaries' from the injurious efforts
to reduce costs that eventually emanated from the managed care sys-
tem.23 5 Congress would not have stripped patients of their timeless
fiduciary protection in light of their goal to protect beneficiaries. 23 6
In the traditional fee-for-service system, society protected patients
by imposing a fiduciary duty on the person or entity in control of the
patients' welfare. 23 7 Thus, the fiduciary responsibility was tradition-
ally placed on the physician who directly controlled patient care. 238
Traditional fee-for-service physicians had no conflicting financial in-
terest because they were paid for each service they performed.2 39
Hence, fee-for-service physicians complied with the physician stan-
dards of professional responsibility.
In today's era of managed care, however, physicians have a con-
flicting financial interest.2 40 Physicians must concern themselves
with limiting the costs of health care as a result of industry pressures
to make a profit for the MCO.241 As the physician's employer, MCOs
dictate the terms by which the physician can provide care, terms that
reflect MCOs' primary concern of financial gain.2 4 2 Thus, physicians'
hands are tied by the system that values profits over patients' lives.
The managed care system must reinstate the fiduciary protection
afforded patients under the fee-for-service system. Accordingly, as
MCOs procure more control over the provision of health care services
to patients, MCOs must assume responsibility when negligent care re-
sults from financial incentives imposed on physicians. In the alterna-
tive, MCOs should devise incentive schemes that facilitate the
pocrates "was conceived some time during the period of Grecian greatness,
probably in the fifth century B.C.... [and] has remained in Western civilization
as an expression of ideal conduct for the physician.").
234. See discussion supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text.
235. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 538 (1995)(Thomas, J., dissenting)(citing
Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987))(discussing the "careful bal-
ance Congress struck in enacting ERISA").
236. See Roland, supra note 5, at 1499 (stating that ERISA provisions interpreted by
courts have 'stripped Americans of their historical legal protections against
health insurance companies' negligence.").
237. See PERRITT, supra note 181, at 58-59.
238. See id.
239. See DEAN M. HARRIS, HEALTHCARE LAw AND ETHICS: ISSUES FOR THE AGE OF MAN-
AGED CARE 267 (1999)(stating that under the fee-for-service medicine, the physi-
cian's financial interest was aligned with the patient's interest).
240. See id. at 267-68.
241. See KNIGHT, supra note 22, at 21 (stating that managed care "epitomizes short-
sighted efforts to reduce health care costs with little regard to patients and physi-
cians or the relationship between them.").
242. See id. at 23.
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performance of the physician's professional responsibility to his or her
patients. MCOs must limit compensation agreements that put physi-
cians in conflict with their patients' best interests and in breach of
their fiduciary duty.
It is important for MCOs to acknowledge the commitment a physi-
cian has to his or her patient, to which doctors swear when they take
the Hippocratic Oath.243 If the current system disables doctors from
carrying out their fiduciary responsibility, then fiduciary liability
must shift to the entity that has the control to carry out the essential
fiduciary role. But in Pegram, the court closed off an avenue of liabil-
ity toward the one entity that had the power to redeem the quality of
care provided to patients under the system of managed care.
V. CONCLUSION
Most Americans receive health care through employer-provided
benefit plans, subjecting the lives of millions of employees and benefi-
ciaries to the provisions of ERISA that insulate MCOs from liability.
As MCOs gain more control over the provision of patient care, courts
can no longer justify insulating from liability the very entities that
have the power to taint physicians' decisions and control the fate of
patients' lives. This Note ultimately emphasizes the need for Con-
gress, in the absence of judicial leadership, to step in and amend ER-
ISA to include an explicit cause of action against the MCOs that
administer physician incentive plans.
243. See supra note 234.
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